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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
marketability of title to the automobile which secured the note
should have been drawn in this case. Had that been done, the
opposite result should have been reached and the lower court's
decision affirmed.
Criminal Law and Procedure
Dale E. Bennett*
CRIMINAL LAW
Attempted Perjury
Article 27 of the Criminal Code1 covers an attempt to commit
any crime, and the penalty is fixed at one-half of that for the
intended offense. The elements of this inchoate crime are a
specific intent to commit the basic offense and the doing of an
act "tending directly toward the accomplishment of that object."
This offense embraces the conduct of one who is apprehended
while his criminal undertaking is still incomplete, or the situa-
tion where completion of the offense was rendered impossible
by some unknown circumstance.
In State v. Latiolais2 the defendant had been charged with
perjury, and a verdict of attempted perjury returned by the
jury.3 Defense counsel argued that there was no separate crime
of attempted perjury, since the basic perjury definition was so
broad that it covered the mere making of a false statement, with
intent to use it in a judicial or official proceeding.4 Any act that
went beyond the zone of preparation, according to this reason-
ing, was either perjury or no crime at all. In overruling this
contention, Justice Hawthorne pointed out that an attempted
perjury verdict would be appropriate in a case where the com-
pleted crime was rendered impossible by some "extraneous cir-
cumstance," such as the fact that the one administering the false
oath was not authorized or qualified to administer it.r This situ-
ation is clearly embraced within the attempt article, which
specifically states that "it shall be immaterial whether, under
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. R.S. 14:27 (1950).
2. 74 So.2d 148 (La. 1954).
3. LA. R.S. 15:406 (1950).
4. LA. R.S. 14:123 (1950).
5. 74 So.2d 148, 150 (La. 1954).
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the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his
purpose."6
Other Crimes
In State v. Milford7 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its pre-
vious holdings that Article 81 of the Criminal Code sufficiently
defined the crime of indecent behavior with juveniles as the
commission "of any lewd or lascivious act upon the person or in
the presence of any child under the age of seventeen, with the
intention of arousing or gratifying the sexual desires of either
person."" While the myriad forms which such reprehensible
behavior may take are not enumerated in the statute, it certainly
establishes a reasonably clear line between proper and criminal
conduct."
In State v. Michel0 the court properly held that voluntary
drunkenness was not a defense to the crime of aggravated rape,
since that offense does not require a specific intent." Article 15
of the Criminal Code12 only recognizes voluntary drunkenness
as a defense to crimes, such as theft or burglary, which require
a specific intent.
In State v. Pye'8 the court held that the carrying of a pocket
knife was not a violation of Article 9514 of the Criminal Code
which defines illegal carrying of weapons to include "[t]he
intentional concealment of any firearm, or other instrumentality
customarily used as a dangerous weapon, on one's person." Chief
Justice Fournet stressed the fact that "the gravamen of the
offense is the concealment on one's person of an instrumentality
customarily used as a dangerous weapon, and not the carrying
of an instrument which might be so used." (Italics supplied.)
A different approach would be taken if the defendant had stabbed
another with the pocket knife and were charged with an aggra-
vated battery.' 5 In such a case the test of a "dangerous weapon"
6. LA. R.S. 14:27(1) (1950).
7. 225 La. 611, 73 So.2d 778 (1954).
8. LA. R.S. 14:81 (1950).
9. For a prior discussion of this problem, see The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1947-1948 Term-Criminal Law and Procedure, 9
LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW 247 (1949).
10. 74 So.2d 207, 213 (La. 1954).
11. LA. R.S. 14:4142 (1950).
12. LA. R.S. 14:15 (1950).
13. 225 La. 365, 72 So.2d 879 (1954).
14. LA. R.S. 14:95 (1950).
15. LA. R.S. 14:34 (1950).
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is the manner of its actual use.16 The crime of illegal carrying
of weapons, however, requires the carrying of an instrumentality
which has a dangerous potentiality in its normal use, as a
revolver or a switch blade.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Extradition
State v. Fleming7 dealt very realistically with the statutory
requirement that the requisition for extradition must be accom-
panied "by duly certified copy of a sworn statement of the com-
plainant, of a statement of facts by the prosecuting attorney"
and of the indictment pending in the state seeking extradition. 8
It was held that the "sworn statement of the complainant" did
not refer to the victim, who would be dead in a homicide case;
and that a statement by a police detective was a sufficient com-
pliance with the statute. Further, it was not necessary for the
district attorney to reiterate the facts. It was sufficient for him
to certify that the sworn statement of the complainant was true
and correct to the best of his information and belief. Meticulous
care must be exercised, however, in making sure that the copy
of the indictment charging the offender with an offense in the
state seeking extradition has been properly authenticated by the
Governor or Chief Justice of that state. 9
Venue
Methods of raising the question of improper venue are illus-
trated by the State v. Paternostro decisions. 20 Improper venue
is usually raised before trial by a plea to the court's jurisdiction2'
or by a motion to quash the indictment.2 2 In the first Paternostro
decision Justice McCaleb pointed out that the question of im-
proper venue, although one of fact, "is a matter not pertaining
to guilt or innocence of the accused which may be raised in
limine and that there is no constitutional prohibition of the right
of the trial judge or this court to decide the issue. '23 If thus
16. LA. R.S. 14:2 (1950) generally defines a "dangerous weapon" as an
instrumentality "which, in the manner used, is calculated or likely to pro-
duce death or great bodily harm."
17. 225 La. 564, 73 So.2d 462 (1954).
18. LA. R.S. 15:160 (1950).
19. State ex rel. Covington v. Hughes, 157 La. 652, 102 So. 824 (1925).
20. 224 La. 87, 68 So.2d 767 (1953), and 225 La. 369, 73 So.2d 177 (1954).
21. State v. Moore, 140 La. 281, 72 So. 965 (1916).
22. State v. Roy, 155 La. 238, 99 So. 205 (1924).
23. 224 La. 87, 94, 68 So.2d 767, 770 (1953).
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raised the venue question would be reviewable by the Supreme
Court.
However, the venue question in the Paternostro case had
not been presented to the trial judge by a special plea before
trial. Apparently it had been submitted to the jury under a
general plea of "not guilty," and the transcript of evidence did
not show a complete absence of proof of proper venue. Under
those circumstances the Supreme Court was without jurisdiction
to review the venue question on appeal. Justice Ponder con-
cluded his opinion in the second decision with the statement that
"It is well established that the sufficiency of evidence regarding
the guilt or innocence of accused will not be inquired into
on appeal. It would be only logical to conclude that this same
rule should apply when the question of venue is submitted to
the jury. '24 This holding is consistent with the State v. Beale2 5
where the Supreme Court held that it was without jurisdiction
to review a jury finding on the issue of prescription which had
been submitted to and considered by the jury under a general
plea of not guilty.
Change of Venue
Change of venue is authorized upon a showing that there is
such prejudice in the public mind that an impartial trial cannot
be obtained in the parish where the indictment is pending.26
An application for change of venue is addressed to the sound dis-
cretion of the trial judge, and his ruling thereon will not be
disturbed except where a clear abuse of discretion is shownY
In State v. Pearson2 a change of venue had been granted for the
first trial, which had resulted in a hung jury. Upon a retrial of
the case the trial judge overruled the defense motion for a change
of venue. In upholding the trial judge's ruling, the Supreme
Court discussed a number of factors which are considered signi-
ficant in change of venue cases. One was the fact that more than
than a year had elapsed since the commission of the homicide
and there had been no demonstration of hostility towards the
defendant in that time. A motion for change of venue looks to
the time of the trial. Bitter and violent prejudice, evident im-
mediately after the crime, may have subsided by the time the
24. 73 So.2d 177, 178 (La. 1954).
25. 163 La. 1093, 113 So. 546 (1927).
26. LA. R.S. 15:292 (1950).
27. State v. Roberson, 159 La. 562, 105 So. 621 (1925).
28. 224 La. 393, 69 So.2d 512 (1953).
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case comes up for trial. Justice Ponder also stressed the fact
that the jury had been selected with four peremptory challenges
unused on each side, thus showing that it had been relatively
easy to empanel a satisfactorily impartial jury. Louisiana juris-
prudence clearly evidences the necessity of a defendant's ex-
hausting his peremptory challenges in any case where he is
objecting to the composition of the jury.2 9 It was evident that
inflammatory and prejudicial newspaper accounts were given
little weight. Such sensational journalistic outbursts are explain-
able as a usual newspaper approach, rather than as indicating
a widespread public resentment or antagonism toward the
accused.
Prescription-Interruption by Prior Indictment
The one-year prescription period is interrupted by the fling
of a prior indictment or information, and it begins to run again
from the time such charge is nolle prosequied or otherwise set
aside.30 Great care must be taken, however, in alleging inter-
ruptions by a previous indictment. In State v. Dooley 3' the
defendant had been indicted for manslaughter on January 11,
1952, which charge was still pending when he was charged with
the offense of simple battery on March 4, 1953. On March 23,
1953, the manslaughter charge was nolle prosequied. The simple
battery indictment had sought to negative the running of the
one-year prescriptive period by alleging that "the offense charged
herein is based upon the same facts which form the basis of the
indictment heretofore returned against the defendant," (citing
the docket number and style of the manslaughter case). This
attempt to negative prescription was held ineffective because of
the failure to state "what offense the relator was previously
charged with or what disposition had been made of the case. '8 2
(Italics supplied.) It may well be that the Supreme Court is
overly technical in the Dooley case; for the nature of the prior
charge was apparent from the court records, and it would be
reasonable to assume the continued pendency of that charge.33
However, the pattern of law enunciated in this decision is clear
29. Accord: State v. Price, 192 La. 615, 188 So. 718 (1939): "A fact
which has a tendency to show that there was no undue prejudice among
the veniremen in this case is that attorneys for defense used only eleven
peremptory challenges. .. "
30. LA. R.S. 15:8 (1950).
31. 223 La. 980, 67 So.2d 558 (1953).
32. Id. at 983, 67 So.2d at 559.
33. Justice Hawthorne, who had filed a vigorous dissent in State v.
Jones, 209 La. 394, 24 So.2d 627 (1945), again dissented.
[VOL. XV
WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
and its requirements must not be disregarded. Where an inter-
vening indictment is alleged as a means of interrupting prescrip-
tion, the indictment must specifically state the nature of that
charge and that the prior indictment had not been quashed or
otherwise dismissed until within one year immediately preceding
the present indictment.3 4
Another question which was not raised in the Dooley case
is whether prescription upon a simple battery charge is inter-
rupted by a manslaughter indictment charging a criminal homi-
cide resulting from the battery. Under the manslaughter charge
the -accused could not have been convicted of a simple battery. 5
While arising out of a single criminal act of the accused, so that
only one criminal prosecution could be had, the crimes of simple
battery and manslaughter are of separate generic classes. They
are not different degrees of the same offense.3 6 Thus, it might be
argued that the bringing of a manslaughter charge would not
serve to interrupt prescription of the simple battery crime. While
Article 8 broadly states that where a prior indictment has been
found prescription is interrupted and shall not "begin to run
against another indictment, information, or affidavit based on the
same facts," until the first charge is set aside, this may well be
construed in line with the general common law requirement that
the interrupting charge must be for the same, or at least sub-
stantially the same, crime.37
The Formal Criminal Charge
In State v. Kelley 3s the defendant was convicted for violation
of the voter registration law,3 9 upon an information charging
that he "willfully and unlawfully caused himself to be regis-
tered as a voter by submitting false information in his applica-
tion for registration." In setting aside this conviction the Su-
preme Court concurred in defense counsel's argument that the
information failed to validly charge a crime, in that it did not
34. In State v. Jones, 209 La. 394, 24 So.2d 627 (1945), the Supreme
Court held that the indictment did not adequately negative the running
of prescription when it failed to allege specifically that the interrupting
indictment had not been quashed or otherwise dismissed until within one
year immediately preceding the filing of the present charge.
35. This is true under the 1948 responsive verdict statute, LA. R.S. 15:386
(1950).
36. Comment, 5 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 603 (1944).
37. For a discussion of analogous decisions in point, see Note, 15 LouIsI-
ANA LAW REVIEW 216 (1954).
38. 73 So.2d 437, 439 (La. 1954).
39. LA. R.S. 18:222 (1950).
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specify the nature of the false information which formed the
basis of the charge. The case relied upon by the majority opinion
was State v. Varnado4° where the court had held a charge of
gambling insufficient for failure to specify which of the myriad
forms of gambling had been committed. As Justice McCaleb,
who dissented in the Kelley case pointed out, the Varnado case is
not apposite. It is one thing to hold that, when all kinds of
gambling have been combined under a short four-line definition,
an indictment is inadequate which simply charges the offense
in the language of the statute without stating the type of gamb-
ling committed. It is quite another thing to require a detailed
allegation of the nature of the false information which forms the
basis of the charge of false registration in the Kelley case. The
false voting provision, as pointed out by the dissenting justice,
denounces three acts as offenses. The information in the princi-
pal case alleged the commission of one of these. It is charged that
the defendant registered illegally by submitting false informa-
tion in his application for registration. If additional details are
desired, relative to the specific false information submitted, the
same may be secured through a bill of particulars. The decision
in the Kelley case presents a doubtful application of the sound
doctrine of the Varnado case. Any further extension of that prin-
ciple may well result in burdening the indictment with a prolix
and cumbersome statement of details which can best be handled
in the less formal bill of particulars.
In Baton Rouge v. Mondy4' the Supreme Court held that a
charge of violation of a city ordinance must be upon an affidavit;
and that a charge of reckless driving could not be based upon a
police report which was not sworn to. The provision which gave
rise to the controversy was the statement in the statute creating
the City of Baton Rouge that "Prosecutions of criminal cases,
when the offense is against the state or parish, shall be by aff-
davit .... -42 From this the city argued that a formal affidavit
was not necessary in charging violations of city ordinances. After
a careful analysis of all relevant provisions of the Code of Crimi-
•nal Procedure, the Supreme Court rejected that inference and
concluded that it was intended that a sworn affidavit was neces-
sary in charging all petty offenses. Justice LeBlanc concluded his
discussion of pertinent general articles of the Code by stating,
40. 208 La. 319, 23 So.2d 106 (1944).
41. 225 La. 229, 72 So.2d 488 (1954).
42. LA. R.S. 13:2072 (1950).
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"We would think that a municipal ordinance is of equal dignity
and importance with an ordinance of a parish police jury and
it is hardly probable that the Legislature would have intended
to require an affidavit for the prosecution of violation of one and
not of the other. ' 43 Admittedly, some confusion has resulted
from the wording of the City of Baton Rouge statute; still it
appears that the Supreme Court correctly held that it was not
intended to set up a special method for charging city ordinance
violations in the City of Baton Rouge.
The Bill of Particulars
The defendant's right to a bill of particulars is an implemen-
tation of his basic constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. At the same
time there are certain practical limitations, administered, in the
sound discretion of the trial judge, as to what information he
can demand.44 One of the most important of these restrictions
is the one that the bill of particulars cannot be employed to
force the state to disclose its evidence in advance of trial.45 This
rule was applied in State v. Shourds46 where a defendant, charged
with unlawfully advertising as an architect without being
licensed as such,47 applied for a bill of particulars as to whether
the advertisements referred to were written or oral and public,
and if written whether in print or in appellant's handwriting.
In upholding the trial judge's refusal to order the furnishing of
the requested information, the Supreme Court stated: "The par-
ticulars demanded have no reference to the charges but rather
were a request for information concerning the kind and charac-
ter of the State's evidence to which appellant was not entitled."8
The Shourds case illustrates the nebulous nature of this rule.
It may be plausibly argued that the requested bill of particulars
was not merely fishing for a recital of the state's evidence, and
was seeking material information as to the method of the alleged
illegal advertising. In such close questions, however, the Su-
preme Court appears to rely largely on the sound discretion of
the trial judge, rather than on its own appraisal of a cold and
43. 72 So.2d 488, 491 (La. 1954).
44. For a complete discussion of these limitations, see Comment, 12
LOUISIANA LAw REVIEW 457 (1952).
45. State v. Michel, 74 So.2d 207 (La. 1954); State v. Poe, 214 La. 606,
38 So.2d 359 (1948); State v. Lee, 173 La. 966, 139 So. 302 (1932); State v.
Fernandez, 157 La. 149, 102 So. 186 (1924).
46. 224 La. 955, 71 So.2d 340 (1954).
47. LA. R.S. 37:158A (1950).
48. 224 La. 955, 960, 71 So.2d 340, 341 (1954).
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inadequate record. The materiality of the information sought
may also be a controlling consideration. The defense cannot
harass the state by demands for non-essential information which
will have little bearing on the ultimate verdict.49 Detailed infor-
mation as to the form and medium of the alleged illegal adver-
tisement might well have been considered as falling in this non-
essential category.
While recognizing that the rule against forcing the state to
reveal the details of its proof in advance of trial is well supported
in our Louisiana jurisprudence, its basic soundness may be ques-
tioned. It is true, of course, that the early release of such infor-
mation would afford unscrupulous defense counsel an opportunity
to manufacture false counterbalancing evidence or otherwise
practice chicanery. Also the state has no device whereby a recip-
rocal right to detailed information as to the defense evidence may
be asserted. However, the innocent defendant is entitled to the
fullest possible protection from unfounded charges and un-
reliable prosecution evidence, and advance notice may be neces-
sary if he is to prepare to meet such charges. Merely furnishing
the accused with a copy of the indictment and particulars as to
how the crime is alleged to have been committed frequently fails
to provide him with enough information to prepare his defense
adequately. The real rights of the many should not be unduly
curtailed because of possible abuse by the unscrupulous few.
Continuance
The granting or refusal of a continuance rests, under an
express provision of Article 320 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure, in "the sound discretion of the trial judge." Exceptional
circumstances, such as a substantial amendment of the indict-
ment which takes the defense by surprise, 0 must be shown
before the trial judge's refusal of a continuance will constitute
an abuse of that discretion. No such situation was presented
in State v. Bolivar.51 Defendant had been separately charged and
arraigned upon charges of receiving stolen property and at-
tempted simple burglary. The cases were set for trial on the
same day, being numbered 5175 and 5176, respectively. On the
day set for trial the information in No. 5175 was changed to
"concealing," instead of "receiving," stolen property. On motion
49. State v. Afford, 206 La. 100, 18 So.2d 666 (1944); State v. Cox, 167 La.
279, 119 So. 48 (1928).
50. LA. R.S. 15:253 (1950).
51. 224 La. 1037, 71 So.2d 559 (1954).
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of defense counsel, the trial judge continued that case. However,
the requested continuance of the requested burglary charge was
refused. In upholding this exercise of the trial judge's dis-
cretion, the Supreme Court pointed out that the change in the
time of the "receiving" trial, which brought the burglary charge
up first, should not have resulted in any great hardship to
defense counsel. Justice Hamiter stressed the fact that both
cases had been set for the same day, without objection by
defense counsel, and approved the trial judge's per curiam
statement that "'It was encumbent on him, under the circum-
stances, to prepare his defense in both of said cases, regardless
of what case the District Attorney saw fit to bring to trial.' "52
Insanity Defenses
Article 269 of the Code of Criminal Procedure55 provides
for the appointment of a lunacy commission to examine the
defendant whenever the sanity of the accused is in issue, whether
present insanity is alleged as a bar to trial or insanity at the
time of the crime is alleged as a defense. The report of this
commission must be "in writing" and "shall be accessible to
the district attorney and to the attorney for the accused. .. ."
In State v. Sauls5 4 the Supreme Court reiterated its former hold-
ing as to the mandatory nature of these requirements.55 The
trial judge had received the lunacy commission's report, as to
the defendant's sanity at the time of the crime, on the day the
case was called for trial. This was held reversible error in that
it had the practical effect of depriving the accused of his sta-
tutory right to examine the report in advance of trial. As was
pointed out by Justice Ponder, this right is denied unless the
defense is afforded access to the report "at a reasonable time
prior to the trial in order that the accused may corroborate or
contradict the report by testimony of other experts if necessary
to his defense."56 In this regard it should be noted that Article
268 expressly provides that the report of the lunacy commis-
sion "shall not preclude the state or defendant from calling
52. Id. at 1041, 71 So.2d at 560.
53. LA. R.S. 15:269 (1950).
54. 224 La. 1063, 71 So.2d 568 (1954).
55. Citing State v. Winfield, 222 La. 157, 62 So.2d 258 (1952), discussed
in The Work of the Loui-siana Supreme Court for the 1952-1953 Term-
Crimina Procedure, 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 231, 235 (1953), where it was
held reversible error for the trial judge to accept telephoned report of the
lunacy commission, which was not accessible to the accused prior to the
hearing.
56. 224 La. 1063, 1067, 71 So.2d 568, 569 (1954).
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expert witnesses to testify at the trial" and that the members
of the commission shall be subject to examination by both the
state and defense counsel. As long as the commission is com-
posed of the coroner and other members whose sole qualification
is that they have practiced medicine three years,5 7 we may
expect that its report will be entitled to little weight, and the
so-called "battle of experts" (psychiatrists employed by the
defense and the state) will continue.58
Where the appointed lunacy commission includes a com-
petent psychiatrist, as in State v. Riviere, 9 the report and tes-
timony of the unbiased commission is entitled to serious con-
sideration. In that case the trial judge, after a complete hearing
wherein defense counsel offered testimony of relatives and
friends of the accused, as well as a psychiatrist, concluded that
the defense had not overcome the normal presumption of san-
ity, in that it had not established a present incapacity of the
accused to understand the nature and object of the proceedings
against him and to assist in the conducting of his defense.
"Rather," concluded Justice Hamiter, after comparing the rather
hazy defense evidence with the clear finding of present sanity
by the lunacy commission, "there is a substantial disclosure
to the contrary."6 0
Double Jeopardy-Two Deaths From a Single Act
In State v. McDonald61 the Louisiana Supreme Court held
that two bills of information for negligent homicide, separately
charging the accused with the killing of each of the two vic-
tims of an automobile collision, could be pending at the same
time. The propriety of two pending charges, regardless of
whether the accused had committed one or two criminal homi-
cides, was well settled. State v. Stewart62 had held that two
manslaughter charges, one by indictment and the other by in-
formation, might be pending at the same time. Only a convic-
tion or acquittal of one of the charges could be pleaded in bar
to any subsequent prosecution for the offense.
A significant double jeopardy issue is raised, more or less
57. LA. R.S. 15:269 (1950).
58. For a discussion of the unfortunate legislative history of the Lunacy
Commission in Louisiana, see Bennett, Louisiana Criminal Procedure-A
Critical Appraisal, 14 LOUISIANA LAW REviEw 11, 24 (1953).
59. 225 La. 114, 72 So.2d 316 (1954).
60. 72 So.2d at 318.
61. 224 La. 555, 70 So.2d 123 (1953).
62. 47 La. Ann. 410, 16 So. 945 (1895).
[VOL. XV
WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
by way of dictum, in the majority opinion. After pointing out
that the question of dual trials was "not now before the court, '8 3
Justice LeBlanc declared, "The killing of each person was a
separate homicide, a separate crime."64 Such a holding is not
supported by the cases cited by the learned Justice, both of
which are distinguishable from the instant case. In State v.
Cannon"5 the accused had killed two women at the same time
and place in "one continuous transaction," but the homicides
did not result from a single act. In State v. Montcrieffe,66 also
relied upon by Justice LeBlanc, there were two separate and
distinct criminal acts committed in immediate consecutive order,
i.e., burglary followed by larceny of goods found in the building.
Similarly, in the recent case of State v. Ysasi67 the defendant
was held to have committed two crimes when he inflicted sepa-
rate batteries upon two individuals in connection with a single
affray. In the above cases the separate crimes, though arising
pursuant to a common criminal transaction or design, resulted
from separate acts of the defendant.
In the McDonald case, however, there was a single criminal
act-crashing into the victims' car as a result of reckless drunken
driving. The defendant had committed a single crime of negli-
gent homicide with two victims. The Louisiana decision most
nearly in point is State v. Batson, where, in upholding the valid-
ity of an indictment in one count for the murdering of six
persons, the Supreme Court declared: "The weight of authority
and of reason sustains the proposition that, though a criminal
act may operate upon more than one person or thing, never-
theless, so long as it is one act, consummated at one time, it
may be charged as one offense."6' 8 An important distinction
in this line of cases should be drawn between a single criminal
act with multiple victims (as in the McDonald case), and mul-
tiple criminal acts arising out of one continuous criminal trans-
action (as in the Cannon and Montcrieffe cases cited by Justice
63. 224 La. 555, 561, 70 So.2d 123, 125 (1953).
64. Ibid.
65. 185 La. 395, 169 So. 446 (1936); accord: State v. Roberts, 170 La. 727,
129 So. 144 (1930), where the defendant committed two murders when he
separately killed a young man and then killed his mother in robbing the
victim's store; cf. State v. Morrison, 184 La. 39, 44, 165 So. 323, 324 (1935),
where the court mistakenly treated the two separate killings as "one con-
tinuous and felonious act." The actual holding may be justified on the
ground that the objection of duplicity came too late in a motion for a new
trial. LA. R.S. 15:221 (1950).
66. 165 La. 296, 115 So. 493 (1928).
67. 222 La. 902, 64 So.2d 213 (1953), 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIww 273.
68. 108 La. 479, 481, 32 So. 478, 479 (1902).
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LeBlanc). While the jurisprudence in other states is generally
in accord with the Batson case's single act-single crime ap-
proach,6 9 there is judicial support for Justice LeBlanc's view
that there may be as many prosecutions as there are victims.
This other view is neatly epitomized by Professor Rollin M. Per-
kins' cryptic suggestion that "there is no bargain rate for multi-
ple killings. '70
Double Jeopardy-Arbitrary Dismissal of Jury
Jeopardy attaches when the jury has been completed and
the indictment read to them.7 1 The subsequent "arbitrary dis-
missal of the jury without cause and without the consent of
the accused, operates as an acquittal. 7 2 (Italics supplied.) The
Supreme Court decision in State v. Roberson7  turned on the
question as to whether the trial judge's ruling of a mistrial,
with the consequent dismissal of the jury, had been arbitrary
or justified. The declaration of the mistrial was necessitated
by the fact that one of the jurors was stricken with a serious
heart attack and ordered to bed by his doctor. In holding that
the discharge of the jury did not operate as an acquittal, Jus-
tice Moise mentioned the fact that defense counsel had made no
69. A member of the student Law Review staff, Miss Helen Wimmer,
reported the general jurisprudence on this point as follows:
The rule of the Batson case is also the majority rule in the common
law states. 3 BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 437 (1913); HUGHES, CRIM-
INAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 2720 (1901); 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 589
(1935). A United States federal court held that a count in an indictment
for transporting women from one state into another for immoral purposes
was not bad for duplicity because it charged the transportation of two
women at the same time for the same purposes. United States v. West-
man, 182 Fed. 1017 (D. Ore. 1910). The Mississippi Supreme Court stated:
"To the objection that there are two distinct murders charged in the
same count, the answer is that, as to this, the indictment is valid on its
face, and not demurrable, since a double murder may be committed by
one and the same act; as for instance, the drowning of two persons at
once." Wilkinson v. State, 77 Miss. 705, 709, 27 So. 639, 640 (1900). In an
early case involving an indictment against a slave for administering poison
to several white persons, an Alabama court said that the court was not
demurrable for duplicity. Ben v. State, 22 Ala. 9, 58 Am. Dec. 234 (1853).
This proposition may be further supported by a Tennessee case holding
that "a single felonious act may result in the death of two individuals;
and though, in such a case, the offender might be indicted for the murder
of one only, he may be indicted for a single offense of murder in the act
of slaying both." Womack v. State, 7 Coldw. 508, 512 (Tenn. 1870).
70. Citing State v. Fredlund, 200 Minn. 44, 273 N.W. 353 (1937), where
separate prosecutions were allowed for the deaths of each of two victims
in a traffic accident. That case is criticized in Note, 5 U. oF CHI. L. REV.
140 (1937). An excellent analysis of the problem is found in Note, 23 IOWA
L. REV. 425 (1938).
71. LA. R.S. 15:277 (1950).
72. LA. R.S. 15:278 (1950).
73. 225 La. 74, 72 So.2d 265 (1954).
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objection to the district attorney's motion for a mistrial.74 How-
ever, that factor was merely makeweight, for Justice Moise
made it abundantly clear that the ultimate question to be decided
was the necessity, as distinguished from arbitrariness, of the
discharge. Citing an earlier case where the discharge had been
necessitated by the serious illness of the trial judge,75 Justice
Moise declared, "'It is well recognized that there has been no
jeopardy when the discharge of the jury has been from neces-
sity.' ))76
The justification for the discharge was not altered by the
fact that the mistrial might have been avoided if the trial judge
had originally ordered the selection of alternate jurors, as author-
ized by a 1940 statute.77 Justice Moise pointed out that the
ordering of alternate jurors is discretionary with the trial judge,
and further that there was no advance indication of a pro-
tracted trial which might necessitate additional jurors.
An incidental point worthy of brief note is the court's hold-
ing that its constitutional supervisory jurisdiction over trial
courts78 gives it plenary power to review immediately the trial
judge's ruling on a double jeopardy plea, despite the express
statement in Article 283 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
that such a ruling shall not be reviewable before trial and
sentence. In such a situation the defendant has no right of
immediate appeal which might be used as dilatory tactics, but
the Supreme Court denies the power of the legislature to limit
the exercise of its plenary discretionary power to grant immedi-
ate review through supervisory writs.79 It is unlikely, however,
that such writs will be frequently granted.
Challenging the Jury Venire
The ambiguous language of Article 202 of the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure 0 that any objections of the jury venire must be
urged "before the expiration of the third judicial day of the
term for which said jury shall have been drawn, or before enter-
ing the trial of the case if it be begun sooner" has been a source
of much confusion. If literally applied, it would have operated
74. 72 So. 2d at 267.
75. State v. Varnado, 124 La. 711, 50 So. 661 (1909).
76. 72 So.2d 265, 268 (La. 1954).
77. LA. R.S. 15:362 (1950).
78. LA. CONST. Art. VII, §§ 2, 10.
79. Citing the leading case of State v. Doucet, 199 La. 276, 5 So.2d 894
(1942).
80. LA. R.S. 15:202 (1950).
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to deny counsel the right to challenge the jury venire in many
instances. In State v. Wilson8' the Supreme Court avoided such
an absurd, and obviously unintended result, by construing that
provision to mean that objections to the jury venire must be
urged before the expiration of the third judicial day following
the term for which the jury had been drawn, or before enter-
ing the trial if it was begun sooner. In State v. Miche8 2 defense
counsel's motion to quash the indictment, on the ground of
systematic racial discrimination, in preparing the general jury
venire, had been overruled on the ground that it had not been
filed within three days after the expiration of the jury term.
Defense counsel sought to attack the Wilson decision, claiming
that it worked an injustice as applied to the case at bar. In
upholding the trial judge's ruling the Supreme Court re-affirmed
the rule of the Wilson decision and pointed out that it worked
no hardship in the present case, since defendant was actually
represented by counsel on the date the jury term ended. Thus,
counsel had ample time, three days from the date of his appoint-
ment, to file his motion to quash the indictment. If, as appellant
contended, defense counsel had' not been appointed until a
date when the three-day period had expired, a real hardship
case would have been presented. In such a case, it would
amount to depriving the accused of the benefit of counsel to
refuse the appointed counsel a three-day interval to prepare
and urge proper objections to the jury venires.
Jurors-Challenge for Bias or Partiality
The most frequently urged special cause for which a juror
may be challenged is "that he is not impartial, the cause of his
bias being immaterial . . . ., This ground is subject, however,
to express qualifications-"but an opinion as to guilt or inno-
cence of the accused, which is not fixed, or that would yield to
evidence, or that could be changed, does not disqualify the
juror." Under present day conditions, where local crimes are
given wide publicity, and often advance trial of a sort, in the
newspaper, this qualification becomes very important. It is
difficult to secure jurors who have no prior information con-
cerning the case, and the trial judge must exercise a broad
discretion in determining whether a particular juror can dis-
regard any preconceived notions and decide the case entirely
81. 204 La. 24, 14 So.2d 873 (1943).
82. 74 So.2d 207 (La. 1954).
83. LA. R.S. 15:351(1) (1950).
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on the evidence adduced at the trial. This is an area where the
Supreme Court, not having the benefit of observing the pro-
spective juror's demeanor on the voir dire examination, is re-
luctant to overrule the trial court's decision, except in cases
where there has been a clear abuse of discretion. This general
hands-off policy was adhered to in State v. McDonald,8 4 a negli-
gent homicide prosecution. The Supreme Court sustained the
overruling of a challenge for cause where a juror admitted
having an initial opinion in the case, but clearly indicated that
the opinion was not fixed and that he would decide the case
entirely on the evidence presented. Two other jurors, who
admitted to a prejudice against driving while drinking, were
held competent when each stated that he "could take the evi-
dence from the witnesses on the stand, and the law as given
to him by the judge, and render a fair and impartial verdict." 5
It is significant that the court held the case "clearly distinguish-
able" from State v. Oliphant86 where the transcript of the con-
fusing voir dire examination had indicated that the juror might
enter upon the trial with an initial presumption of guilt rather
than of innocence. Even then the distinction appears to be more
one of degree than of kind.
Habitual Offender Law
Louisiana's habitual offender law provides increasingly se-
vere penalties for the convicted felon who is found to be a multi-
ple offender.s7 In State v. Clague8 the Supreme Court approved
the sentencing of a convicted felon as a triple offender, despite
the fact that he had not previously been charged as a double
offender. As a matter of fact, the defendant could not have been
held a second offender, since his second crime was apparently
committed before the first conviction. However, that played no
part in the case. It was the fact of the defendant's two previous
convictions, regardless of prior multiple offender prosecutions,
which determined the penalty to be imposed.8 9 Consistent with
84. 224 La. 555, 70 So.2d 123 (1954).
85. Id. at 564, 70 So.2d at 126.
86. 220 La. 489, 56 So.2d 846 (1952), discussed in The Work of the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court for the 1951-1952 Term-Criminaz Procedure, 13 LOUISIANA
LAW REVIEW 326, 333 (1953).
87. LA. R.S. 15:529.1 (1950); see Wilson, The Louisiana Criminal Code-
Making the Punishment Fit the Criminal, 5 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 53, 60
(1942).
88. 224 La. 27, 68 So.2d 746 (1953).
89. Relying on State v. George, 218 La. 18, 48 So.2d 265 (1950), discussed
in The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1950-1951 Term-
Criminal Procedure, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 175, 179 (1952), where the
offender had been sentenced to life imprisonment as a sixth offender.
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this line of reasoning, the Supreme Court easily disposed of
defense counsel's further argument that the two previous con-
victions should be treated as one since they had been punished
by concurrent sentences. The controlling consideration, accord-
ing to Justice Moise, was the fact that "[t]here were trials and
convictions of two separate offenses." 9
Narcotic Drug Violations-Applicability of General Suspended
Sentence Provisions
In adopting the Uniform Narcotics Drug Law91 Louisiana
enacted its elaborate penalty clause which provided that where
an offender was convicted of being an addict for the first time,
the court might suspend sentence and place the offender on
probation, conditioned upon his voluntarily entering a federal
hospital for narcotics treatment.9 2 It was implicit in this pro-
vision that other narcotics law offenders, such as the actual
dope peddlers, would not be eligible for suspended sentences
and probation, even though they might otherwise come within
the general provisions authorizing suspended sentence and pro-
bation. In State v. Lucas9 3 a first offender, convicted as a habi-
tual narcotics user, had been given a ten-year suspended sen-
tence and placed on probation. Thereafter, he was convicted
of another felony (theft), and the suspension of his sentence
was revoked. The revocation was based upon the express pro-
vision in Article 538 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that
conviction of another crime during the suspension of sentence
should be a ground for terminating the suspension and ordering
service of the original sentence.9 4
The Supreme Court was justified in its general holding that
the probation clause in the Narcotics Act should be administered
in accordance with general statutory procedure for suspended
sentence and probation. The legislature has limited the extent
to which the suspended sentence with probation is available
for first offenders in narcotics cases, and they have added a
special condition that the probationer must submit to medical
treatment. However, this special probation clause has not pur-
ported to provide a complete procedure for administering the
probation. It may be logically assumed that where a general
90. 224 La. 27, 31, 68 So.2d 746, 747 (1953).
91. LA. R.S. 40:961-984 (1950).
92. LA. R.S. 40:981 (1950).
93. 225 La. 27, 71 So.2d 870 (1954).
94. LA. R.S. 15:538 (1950).
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procedure is established, as had been done by the 1942 Sus-
pended Sentence and Probation Law,' 5 it will be applicable to
all cases, except to the extent that it is repugnant to the ex-
press provisions of other special enactments.
The Lucas decision has gone too far, however, in holding
that Article 538 is applicable to the probation of a convicted
narcotics violator (a felony). The authorization and procedure
for suspended sentence and probation in felony cases is gov-
erned by Articles 530 through 534 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure" which authorizes the sentencing judge "to place the
offender on probation for such period and upon such terms as
the court may deem best."' Suspended sentence in misde-
meanor cases is separately provided for in Articles 536 through
538.8 It will be noted that in misdemeanor cases sentence is
suspended "on good behavior" which is specifically defined in
Article 536 as meaning "that the offender shall not be convicted
of any other crime during the time of such suspended sentence."
Article 538 then sets up the procedure to be followed when
a misdemeanant is convicted of another crime during the sus-
pension of his sentence.
Possibly the commission of another felony, as in the Lucas
case, may be a ground for revocation of the probation without
the application of Article 538. It may logically be held that
abstinence from additional felonies is an implied condition of
every suspension of sentence and probation granted in a felony
case.99 Again, in the absence of an applicable statutory pro-
vision, it may be necessary for the sentencing judge to state
this condition expressly. At any rate, it does not appear logical
that Article 538, which is found in the separately enacted pro-
visions for suspension of sentence in misdemeanor cases, should
be treated as part of the law governing suspended sentence
and probation in felony cases. As an added argument against
such application, it should be noted that Article 538 refers to
conviction of "any other felony or misdemeanor." It would be
rather harsh to hold that a felony probation should be revoked,
95. Wilson, The Louisiana Criminal Code-Making the Punishment Fit
the Criminal, 5 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 53, 55 (1942).
96. LA. R.S. 15:530-534 (1950).
97. LA. R.S. 15:530 (1950).
98. LA. R.S. 15:536-538 (1950).
99. In State ex rel. Waggoner v. Cozart, 222 La. 1039, 64 So.2d 424 (1953),
a convicted felon who had been reprieved (type of suspension of sentence
by executive clemency) was found to have forfeited his reprieve when he
committed another felony while enjoying his temporary freedom.
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with serious results following, by reason of the commission of
some petty misdemeanor. Yet such would be the result of an
application of Article 538.
In State v. Thomas'0 0 the provision in the Narcotics Act, 1 1
which made those convicted of narcotics violations ineligible
for parole, was held constitutional. In rejecting a claim that this
prohibition denied "equal protection" to parole violators, Chief
Justice Fournet declared that the Supreme Court should not
inquire into the wisdom of the legislative determination that
narcotics violators should be denied the parole privilege ac-
corded to other classes of offenders.10 2
Declaration of Mistrial Because of Improper Remarks
Some improper remarks, when made by the district attorney
in the presence of the jury, are So highly prejudicial that their
effect cannot be cured by an admonition by the judge that
they shall be disregarded. 10 3 In such instances the trial judge
has no alternative but to declare a mistrial. However, where
the improper remark is an unsolicited statement by a witness,
it will take a very extreme case before the court will hold that
the prejudicial effect of the remark cannot be adequately cured
by a judicial admonition to disregard. In State v. Barbarian0 4
the defendant was on trial for simple burglary and a police
officer was testifying as to what the accused had said when
confronted by the prosecuting witness who found him in her
bedroom. The police officer stated, "He said it wasn't true, that
he didn't fool with white women. He admitted he fooled with
dope." The Supreme Court approved the trial judge's action in
refusing defense counsel's motion for a mistrial and admonish-
ing the jury to disregard completely the irrelevant derogatory
statement. While ample authority is cited for the proposition
that the witness's unsolicited statement is not incurable error,
it should be remembered that the rule applied is qualitative,
and not a "rule of thumb" to be blindly applied. If, for example,
a state witness should suddenly blurt out an unsolicited vehe-
ment attack upon Negro sex maniacs in a case where a colored
defendant was charged with committing aggravated rape upon
100. 224 La. 431, 69 So.2d 738 (1953).
101. LA. R.S. 40:981 (1950).
102. 224 La. 431, 436, 69 So.2d 738, 740 (1953).
103. For a complete analysis of the problem see Comment, 10 LOUISIANA
LAW REVIEW 486 (1950).
104. 72 So.2d 306, 307 (La. 1954).
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a white victim, the resulting prejudice would be so great that
the trial judge would commit reversible error in refusing defense
counsel's motion for a mistrial.
Bills of Exceptions
Several 1953-54 decisions focus attention upon the nature
and importance of the bill of exceptions. In State v. Pearson'0 5
the Supreme Court refused to consider alleged errors in the
judge's charge to the jury, applying the well-settled rule that
an erroneous ruling is not reviewable upon appeal unless an
exception is duly taken and a formal bill reserved. Justice
Ponder pointed out that this requirement is not a mere tech-
nical refinement of procedural law, declaring that "the purpose
of the law is to call the trial Judge's attention to the error com-
plained of and afford him an opportunity to correct it."'10 6 State
v. Bell'0 7 applied the rule that the bills of exceptions reserved
during the trial must be perfected by defense counsel and
signed by the trial judge before appeal is taken. In refusing
to order the trial judge to sign bills of exception, the Supreme
Court pointed out that the trial judge is divested of jurisdiction
over the case when the order of appeal is entered,10 8 and any
unsigned bills of exception are treated as abandoned.0 9 It is
another important requirement that the bill of exceptions must
include the facts and circumstances upon which the ruling
complained of was made, thus providing an official record for
review by the Supreme Court. In State v. Jouvet"10 the bill of
exceptions, taken to the overruling of a motion for a new trial
on the ground that the verdict was "contrary to the law and
the evidence,""' was held to present nothing for review by the
Supreme Court, since no transcript of the evidence had been
annexed to and incorporated in the bill of exceptions. It should
be noted that, even where a proper transcript of evidence is
presented, the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction is limited
105. 224 La. 393, 69 So.2d 512 (1953); accord: State v. Washington, 74
So.2d 200 (La. 1954).
106. 224 La. 393, 400, 69 So.2d 512, 514 (1953); accord: State v. Poole,
156 La. 434, 440, 100 So. 613, 615 (1924) (as to the purpose of the bill of ex-
ceptions).
107. 224 La. 858, 71 So.2d 225 (1954).
108. State v. Dartez, 222 La. 9, 62 So.2d 83 (1952), discussed in The
Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1952-1953 Term-Crimnal
Procedure, 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 231, 243 (1953).
109. State v. Chretien, 184 La. 739, 167 So. 426 (1936).
110. 224 La. 15, 68 So.2d 741 (1953); accord: State v. Thomas, 224 La.
431, 69 So.2d 738 (1954).
Ill. LA. R.S. 15:509(1) (1950).
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to issues of law and can only be invoked where the annexed
transcript shows a complete lack of evidence upon some essential
element of criminal liability.112
New Trial--To Serve the Ends of Justice
The reasons for granting a new trial are stated in Article
509 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 113 The fifth ground is
a sort of omnibus "last straw" provision, applying where the
accused has no legal right to a new trial, but the court feels
"that the ends of justice would be served by the granting of a
new trial. 11 4 As was pointed out in State v. Bolivar,l s5 "In this
provision the trial judge is vested with almost unlimited dis-
cretion, and his denial of a new trial should not be interfered
with unless there has been a palpable abuse of that discretion."
Actually it is difficult to imagine any situation where the refusal
to grant a new trial on this ground could raise a question of
law reviewable by the Supreme Court. To date, no such reversal
has ever been ordered. The Bolivar case presented a typical
blind appeal to judicial leniency of the trial court under the
all-embracive ground number five. The defendant claimed no
trial irregularities. He merely proposed to offer two new wit-
nesses, without alleging that they were newly discovered or
otherwise unavailable at the trial. 16
New Trial-Reference to First Conviction
Section 515 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 17 states that
when a new trial has been granted the retrial of the case shall
be conducted "with as little prejudice to either party as if it
had never been tried." In State v. Holmes"" a simple burglary
conviction had been reversed because of the trial judge's error
in refusing to require the state to furnish necessary particu-
lars.119 After a second trial had resulted in another conviction,
defense counsel argued that the defendant had been prejudiced
112. This requirement was met under the exceptional facts of State v.
Giangosso, 157 La. 360, 102 So. 429 (1924), where the approved statement
of facts contained in the bill of exceptions showed that the alleged "stolen"
car belonged to the defendant, thus making it legally impossible that he be
guilty of receiving stolen goods. Thus the trial judge committed an error
of law in refusing a new trial.
113. LA. R.S. 15:509 (1950).
114. LA. R.S. 15:509(5) (1950).
115. 224 La. 1037, 1041, 71 So.2d 559, 560 (1954).
116. LA. R.S. 15:509(3), 15:511 (1950).
117. LA. R.S. 15:515 (1950).
118. 224 La. 941, 71 So.2d 335 (1954).
119. State v. Holmes, 223 La. 397, 65 So.2d 890 (1953).
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by the fact that the state's attorney, in his argument to the jury,
had mentioned the prior conviction and stated that the Supreme
Court's reversal of the conviction was not to be considered as
evidence of innocence because that court did not pass on ques-
tions of fact but only on matters of law. If the district attorney
had originally injected the fact of the previous verdict into the
case, it might well have constituted an incurable prejudicial
remark necessitating the immediate declaration of a mistrial.
This would have been closely analogous to the case where the
district attorney improperly admonished the jury in reaching
its verdict, to consider the fact that the grand jury had indicted
the accused. 120 Such efforts to influence the jury are not only
improper, but may well be so serious that no admonition of
the trial judge can erase their prejudicial effect upon the minds
of the jurors.121 In holding that the district attorney's remarks
in the instant case were proper, the Supreme Court stressed
the fact that "[t]he plain purpose of this argument was to coun-
teract any favorable inferences which might have been drawn
by the jury from this Court's reversal of the former convic-
tion.' 22 The opinion does not make the matter clear, but it is
assumed that the evidence being contradicted had been intro-
duced by the defense, as in State v. Scarborough"28 which Justice
McCaleb cites with approval.124
A related objection, which came too late for the first time
in a motion for a new trial, was with respect to the endorse-
ment of the first jury's "guilty" verdict which appeared upon
the information handed to the jury at the second trial. If season-
ably requested to do so, the trial judge should instruct the jury
to disregard the results of the first proceedings and try the
accused solely on the evidence introduced at the present trial.
The solution of the problem raised by the endorsement of the
prior jury's "guilty" verdict upon the information is clearly
suggested in another part of the opinion where Justice McCaleb
states, "Since it is self evident that it would hardly be feasible
in most cases to withhold from the jury all knowledge of the
prior proceedings, any erroneous inferences which might be
drawn can be easily and adequately forestalled or dispelled by
120. State v. Fletcher, 210 La. 409, 27 So.2d 179 (1946).
121. See Comment, 10 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 486 (1950).
122. State v. Holmes, 224 La. 941, 947, 71 So.2d 335, 337 (1954), citing
Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430 (1887).
123. 152 La. 669, 94 So. 204 (1922).
124. State v. Holmes, 224 La. 941, 946, 71 So.2d 335, 337 (1954).
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proper instructions from the judge to the effect that the case
is to be decided upon the evidence produced at the retrial and
that the results of any former trial and reversal by the appellate
court should be disregarded in determining the guilt or innocence
of the accused. '125
Assignment of Error-Substantial Defects in Indictment
The pronouncement in Article 253 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure that no conviction shall be set aside or reversed "on
account of any defect in form or substance of the indictment,
unless the objection to such indictment, specifically stating the
defect claimed, be made prior to the commencement of the
trial or at such time thereafter as the court in its discretion
permit,"'126 (Italics supplied.) must be read in the light of the
jurisprudence adapting it to other controlling provisions of the
Code. As thus construed, the stated restriction is limited to
formal defects, and the phrase "or substance" is practically
read out.
In the leading case of State v. McDonald127 a motion in
arrest of judgment was sustained to a conviction under a sub-
stantially defective burglary indictment which failed to state
that a building had been burglarized. In setting aside the con-
viction, despite the fact that no objection had been raised either
before or during the trial, the Supreme Court stressed the fun-
damental idea that there can be no valid conviction on an in-
dictment which fails to charge the essential elements of the
crime. Justice Odom stressed the further point that the motion
in arrest of judgment provisions, 28 which deal with substantial
defects patent on the face of the record, would be "a vain and
useless formality" if not applied to such a case. An even later
attack upon a conviction based on a substantially defective
indictment was allowed in State v. Roth. 29 The appellant had
been tried and convicted upon a bill of information which
failed to state the essential elements of the crime of obscenity.30
At no prior stage of the proceedings had any attack been made
upon the information by demurrer, motion to quash, or motion
in arrest of judgment. However, since the defect in the infor-
125. Ibid.
126. LA. R.S. 15:253 (1950).
127. 178 La. 612, 152 So. 308 (1934).
128. LA. R.S. 15:517-520 (1950).
129. 224 La. 439, 69 So.2d 741 (1953).
130. LA. R.S. 14:106 (1950).
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mation was a substantial defect and patent on the face of the
record, it was properly raised by an assignment of error to the
Supreme Court. Article 560 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
specifically authorizes the method of direct original appeal to
the Supreme Court for "any error apparent on the face of the
record."
Justice McCaleb's dissenting opinion was largely predi-
cated on the idea that the omission of the words "lewd, las-
civious, filthy or sexually" in charging the displaying of inde-
cent prints, etc., was a mere defect of form. Formal defects
must be raised before trial under Article 284 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure and would be cured by the verdict under
Article 418.131 Justice McCaleb declares that the controlling
consideration is whether the defect is one which could be sup-
plied by amendment, if timely raised in the lower court. That
approach begs the real question of whether the defect was for-
mal or substantial.1 2 In view of the importance of the qualify-
ing language, which had been added in 1950 in order to provide
a constitutional definition of the obscenity crime, it would appear
that there has been an omission of an essential element of the
crime-a defect of substance rather than form. As such it went
to the basic sufficiency of the charge and prevented a valid
conviction.
Appellate Jurisdiction of Supreme Court
The constitutional limitation, that the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction is limited to "questions of law alone,1 33
was raised in a number of cases.
In State v. Vittoria,'14 defendant appealed from a simple
burglary conviction, claiming that "no reasonable evidence"
had been offered to show that the unauthorized entry was
with an intent to steal. Justice McCaleb briefly ruled that "[t]he
question of appellant's specific intent was one of fact for deter-
mination by the jury. Its decision on that issue is not review-
131. La. R.S. 15:284, 15:418 (1950).
132. In State v. Johnson, 181 La. 1, 158 So. 570 (1934) a valid conviction
was had upon an information which had been ordered amended so as to
supply essential elements of the crime omitted from the original informa-
tion. It is submitted that the omissions, had they not been cured by
amendment, would have been defects of substance which could have been
first raised either by motion in arrest of judgment or by assignment of
error to the Supreme Court.
133. LA. CONST. Art. VII, § 10.
134. 224 La. 258, 69 So.2d 36 (1953).
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able on appeal. Our jurisdiction in criminal cases is limited to
matters of law alone."188 The factual question related to basic
"guilt or innocence" and came squarely within the general con-
stitutional limitation. If defense counsel had established a com-
plete lack of proof of the essential intent element, by incor-
porating a full transcript of the testimony in his bill of excep-
tions, he would have presented an error of law in the refusal
of the trial judge to set aside the verdict.8 0 Even then, the
proper procedure for attacking the trial judge's ruling would
have been by filing a motion for a new trial. The motion in
arrest, as filed in the Vittoria case, serves a very narrow func-
tion. It goes only to errors patent on the face of the record,
and cannot be used as a substitute for the much broader motion
for a new trial in urging errors of the trial judge. 13'7
In State v. Roberts18 defense counsel sought to invoke ap-
pellate review by alleging that "the record disclosed no pro-
bative evidence to support the convictions." The facts of the
case, as reflected in the transcript of the trial, which had been
incorporated in the bills reserved when the motion for a new.
trial was overruled, did not sustain the defendant's contention.
In refusing to review the facts Chief Justice Fournet again
emphasized the "definite line of demarcation between an insuffi-
ciency of evidence and a total lack of evidence of the fact or
facts required to prove the guilt of the party accused."'1 8 9 There
was some proof of the essential elements of criminal liability
in the Roberts case, and it was not within the province of the
Supreme Court to pass upon the factual question of the suffi-
ciency of that evidence to support a conviction beyond a reason-
able doubt. In State v. Brown,40 however, a gambling convic-
tion was reversed when the record showed a complete absence
of proof that the defendant had been engaged in the dice game
"as a business.'14 1
Appeals from criminal convictions of adults tried in the
juvenile court were involved in two Supreme Court opinions
135. Id. at 261, 69 So.2d at 37.
136. State v. Giangosso, 157 La. 360, 102 So. 429 (1924), where the un-
disputed facts showed that the car defendant was charged with receiving
parts from was not a stolen car.
137. State v. Eubanks, 179 La. 92, 153 So. 31 (1934).
138. 224 La. 491, 70 So.2d 100 (1953); accord: State v. Thomas, 224 La.
431, 69 So.2d 738 (1953); State v. Barbarian, 225 La. 89, 72 So.2d 306 (1954).
139. State v. Roberts, 224 La. 491, 497, 70 So.2d 100, 102 (1953).
140. 224 La. 480, 70 So.2d 96 (1954).
141. LA. R.S. 14:90 (1950) specifically requires that the gambling be
conducted "as a business."
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in connection with a conviction of criminal neglect of family
in State v. Tanner. In the first of these opinions, 1 42 the Supreme
Court held that the scope of appeal from juvenile court misde-
meanor convictions was broader than from criminal district
court judgments. In ordinary cases, the constitution limits the
right to appeal from misdemeanor conviction to situations
where "a fine exceeding three hundred dollars or imprisonment
exceeding six months has been actually imposed.' 14 In grant-
ing an appeal to the defendant whose sentence was below the
general jurisdictional amount,'4 4 the Supreme Court stressed
the fact that the special constitutional provision, and imple-
menting legislation, for appeals from juvenile court judgments 45
would prevail over the general provision as to appeals from
misdemeanor convictions.
In the second opinion,' 46 the Supreme Court held that a
juvenile court's trial of an adult defendant was essentially a
criminal case, and was subject to the general limitation that
appeal is on "questions of law alone."' 47 This was consistent
with the special constitutional provision governing appeals from
juvenile court decisions, which grants an appeal on both law
and facts from custody and adoption judgments, but concludes
that "in all other cases an appeal shall lie on questions of law
alone."'148
Evidence
Carlos E. Lazarus*
There were only two cases of interest involving points of
evidence during the 1953-1954 term. The others merely re-
affirmed well-recognized principles which need not be commented
upon.
Under Article 2278 of the Civil Code, the acknowledgment
or promise of a party deceased to pay a debt in order to interrupt
142. State v. Tanner, 224 La. 19, 68 So.2d 743 (1953).
143. LA. CONST. Art. VII, § 10.
144. In State v. Jackson, 224 La. 830, 71 So.2d 127 (1954), the Supreme
Court dismissed an appeal from a regular misdemeanor conviction in the
district court, where the sentence imposed had been only "six months im-
prisonment."
145. LA. CONST. Art. VII, § 52, as amended.
146. 224 La. 374, 69 So.2d 505 (1954).
147. LA. R.S. 15:160 (1950).
148. LA. CONST. Art. VII, § 52, as amended.
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